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TEXAS BANK OF BEAUMONT V. BOZORG:
THE SUPREME COURT ADDRESSES
COLLATERAL MORTGAGES
On August 12, 1975, Kazem Bozorg executed a collateral mortgage
note and mortgage in the amount of $200,000. On the same day he
pledged the collateral mortgage note to First Metropolitan Bank of
Jefferson Parish to secure a loan of $200,000, represented by a hand
note. This mortgage was subsequently recorded. Later, on September
11, 1978, Bozorg executed another collateral mortgage note and mortgage
in the amount of $344,406.59. He pledged the collateral mortgage note
to Massey-Ferguson, Inc., on that same day, to secure a loan of
$344,406.59, also represented by a hand note. The mortgage was sub-
sequently recorded. On January 4, 1980, by notarial act and for the
stated consideration of $88,025.34, the balance then due on Bozorg's
hand note, First Metropolitan transferred and assigned to Texas Bank
of Beaumont "all its rights, title, interest, priority, and privilege in
connection with a certain collateral mortgage note, dated August 12,
1975, in the principal sum of [two hundred thousand] dollars, . . . and
a collateral mortgage . . . mortgaging in favor of any person, firm, or
corporation the following described real estate. . . . " Mr. Bozorg ex-
ecuted a hand note for $200,000 on February 4, 1980 and repledged to
Texas Bank the 1975 collateral mortgage note that it had had acquired
from First Metropolitan. Texas Bank made an advance to Mr. Bozorg
on this new hand note. When Bozorg later defaulted on the hand note,
Texas Bank foreclosed and sought to enforce the 1975 mortgage. Massey-
Ferguson intervened seeking recognition of its 1978 mortgage, claiming
that this mortgage was superior in rank to Texas Bank's mortgage. The
trial court found that Texas Bank had paid off and extinguished the
original debt and therefore was not entitled to retroactive ranking. The
court of appeal reversed, concluding that First Metropolitan had assigned
the entire collateral mortgage package, including the hand note, and
therefore Texas Bank was entitled to retroactive ranking. The Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that Texas Bank had estab-
lished that the January 4, 1980 transaction was at least a payment with
subrogation which preserved the 1975 collateral mortgage ranking as to
Bozorg's then existing principal obligation, but had failed to establish
that the parties agreed in the 1975 contract of pledge that the pledge
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was intended to secure any future obligations of Bozorg; therefore, there
could be no retroactive ranking for the amount in excess of $88,025.34.
Texas Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 667 (La. 1984).
The Collateral Mortgage in Louisiana
A mortgage is an accessory right which is granted to a creditor over
the property of another as security for a debt.' There are three possible
types of mortgages: conventional, legal, and judicial.2 Within the area
of conventional mortgages, Louisiana recognizes three different forms:
an ordinary conventional mortgage, 3 a mortgage to secure future ad-
vances,4 and a collateral mortgage.' A collateral mortgage, unlike the
other forms of conventional mortgages, is not a "pure" mortgage; rather,
it is the result of judicial recognition that one can pledge a note secured
by yet another obligation. 6
The collateral mortgage combines the concepts of both pledge and
mortgage. 7 The mortgage indirectly secures an obligation via a pledge.
A negotiable note, usually referred to as a collateral mortgage note or
a ne varietur note, is made payable on demand' to bearer.9 This note
is paraphed for identification with an act of mortgage, known as the
"collateral mortgage," which provides the creditor with security in the
enforcement of the note. 0
Up to this point, a collateral mortgage appears to be identical to
the ordinary conventional mortgage and the mortgage to secure future
advances. The difference, however, is that in the ordinary conventional
mortgage and the mortgage to secure future advances', the money is
1. La. Civ. Code arts. 3278 and 3284.
2. La. Civ. Code art. 3286.
3. This is also commonly referred to as a mortgage to secure a particular debt. La.
Civ. Code art. 3292.
4. La. Civ. Code art. 3290.
5. Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Foy, 261 La. 573, 260 So. 2d 628 (1972).
6. First Guaranty Bank v. Alford, 366 So. 2d 1299, 1302 (La. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Alford].
7. Nathan & Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage, 33 La. L. Rev. 497, 498 (1973).
8. The note is made payable on demand because of Louisiana Civil Code article
3170. This article provides that if a credit which has been given in pledge becomes due
before it is redeemed by the pledgor, the creditor shall be justified in enforcing payment
of the credit. By making the collateral mortgage note payable on demand, the collateral
mortgagee is entitled to foreclose on the collateral mortgage note at any time.
9. The note is made out in bearer form so that it can be transferred by mere
delivery. La. R.S. 10:3-202 (1983). If made payable to order, an indorsement would be
required for a transfer. In order to use executory process, the indorsement would have
to be in authentic form. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2635, comment; Miller Lyon & Co.
v. Cappel, 36 La. Ann. 264 (1884).
10. Alford, 366 So. 2d at 1302.
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advanced directly on the note that is paraphed for identification with
the act of mortgage. In the collateral mortgage situation, the money is
not directly advanced on the collateral mortgage note; rather, the collateral
mortgage note and the mortgage which secures it are pledged to secure
another obligation."' This obligation is generally evidenced by another
promissory note, which is referred to as a "hand note;" however, there
is no requirement that such a hand note exist.' 2
Because the collateral mortgage is in essence, a pledge, it differs in
another respect from the other forms of conventional mortgage. The
Louisiana Civil Code provides that "it is essentially necessary to the
existence of a mortgage, that there shall be a principal debt to serve
as a foundation for it . . in all cases where the principal debt is
extinguished, the mortgage disappears with it."'" When the promissory
note which is paraphed with the ordinary conventional mortgage or
future advance mortgage is paid off, the mortgage ceases to exist. The
collateral mortgage, as do the other forms of conventional mortgage,
requires the existence of a principal obligation; the principal obligation
is the collateral mortgage note. The collateral mortgage note, secured
by the collateral mortgage, 4 is pledged to secure another obligation.' 5
According to the principles of pledge, when this latter obligation is
extinguished, the pledged item is neither valueless nor extinguished-
only the privilege which arises from the pledge is extinguished. For
example, when one pledges $50,000 of General Motors stock to secure
a specific $25,000 loan, the stock does not become valueless when the
debt is paid. Only the pledgee's right to have his debt satisfied out of
the proceeds of the stock is extinguished. 16 Upon payment of the $25,000
debt, the pledgor is entitled to possession of his General Motors stock.
This stock can then be repledged to secure other obligations. Similarly,
when the specific obligation which is secured by the pledge of the
collateral mortgage package is extinguished, the privilege of the pledgee
is extinguished, but the collateral mortgage package remains in existence
and can be repledged to secure other obligations.
A collateral mortgage package may be pledged as security for either
a pre-existing obligation, an obligation created simultaneously with the
11. Id.
12. There is no requirement that a hand note exist because a pledge can secure an
oral obligation. See La. civ. Code arts. 3136, 1756 and 1760.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 3285.
14. The collateral mortgage note and collateral mortgage which secures it are some-
times referred to collectively as a collateral mortgage package.
15. This obligation could be a specific debt, a specific series of debts, or all obligations
that the pledgor owes to the creditor, whether these obligations exist now or may arise
in the future. La. Civ. Code art. 3158; Alford, 366 So. 2d at 1299.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 3157.
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mortgage, or for future obligations. '7 These future obligations may be
binding or non-binding. 8 If the collateral mortgage is given to secure
a particular obligation, either pre-existing or created simultaneously with
the collateral mortgage, the mortgage is effective against third parties
upon recordation of the mortgage and pledge of the collateral mortgage
note.' 9 If it is pledged to secure future obligations, the issue presented
is when the collateral mortgage securing each of these will be effective
against third parties. Louisiana Civil Code article 3158 provides that
any pledge (which would include the pledge of a collateral mortgage
package) to secure future obligations will rank from the date the item
(including a collateral mortgage package) was originally pledged,20 rather
than from the date that the obligations are fulfilled, as long as the
parties agree initially that the pledge will secure future obligations. In
a collateral mortgage package there is no requirement that this pledge
agreement be in writing; 2' however, for purposes of proving the parties'
intent, the agreement should be reduced to writing.
22
17. Nathan, supra note 7, at 498.
18. Note, Security Devices-Ranking of Collateral Mortgage Security Reissued Mort-
gage Note, 25 La. L. Rev. 789, 792 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, Ranking of Collateral
Mortgage]; the author's reference to non-binding future obligations refers to the situation
in which the creditor is not obligated to make any advances to the debtor. Cf. Vetter,
The Validity and Ranking of Future Advances Mortgages in Louisiana, 21 Loy. L. Rev.
141 (1975).
19. There is some troublesome language in the Bozorg opinion which could be
construed to mean that the collateral mortgage is effective against third parties from the
date of recordation. Within its discussion of the types of collateral mortgages, the court
indicates when each mortgage would be effective against third parties, Bozorg 457 So.
2d at 671. The court states that a mortgage to secure a particular debt ranks from the
date of recordation. A collateral mortgage never ranks from date of recordation alone.
The jurisprudence is settled that the privilege resulting from a collateral mortgage, regardless
of the type of debt secured, does not arise from the registry of the act of mortgage, but
rather from the earliest concurrence of recordation plus the date the note is pledged. This
statement in Bozorg would only be correct if it referred to an ordinary conventional
mortgage to secure a particular debt and not a collateral mortgage to secure a particular
debt. See e.g., Walmsley v. Resweber, 105 La. 522, 535, 30 So. 5, II (1901) (Provosty,
J. concurring); New Orleans Silversmiths, Inc. v. Toups, 261 So. 2d 252, 254 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1972); Wallace v. Fidelity National Bank, 219 So. 2d 342, 344 (La. App. ist
Cir. 1969); Installment Plan, Inc. v. Justice, 209 So. 2d 68, 69 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968);
Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc. 165 So. 2d 855, 865 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Rex
Finance Co. v. Cary, 145 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962), aff'd., 154 So. 2d 360
(La. 1960).
20. This statement assumes that the mortgage has already been recorded. Louisiana
Civil Code article 3342 provides that a mortgage is effective against third persons only
when it has been recorded. This requirement would apply to a collateral mortgage.
21. The reason is that Louisiana Civil Code article 3158 provides that a written act
of pledge is not necessary for the pledge of a negotiable instrument.
22. In the past, some lower courts have found this intent solely from language found
NOTES
The jurisprudence appears to be well-settled that a collateral mort-
gage given with the intent that it secure binding future obligations will
rank from the date that both the mortgage is recorded and the collateral
mortgage note is pledged. 23 Louisiana courts, however, have for years
struggled to decide whether this same rule applies when a mortgage is
pledged to secure optional future obligations, such as when the debtor
pledges a collateral mortgage package to a creditor, and they agree that
if the creditor lends money to the debtor, it will be secured by this
package.
There are two lines of authority on this issue. The first takes the
position that when a mortgage is given to secure optional future loans,
recordation and pledge are not sufficient to make it effective against
third parties. There must also be an actual advance of funds. Bozorg
stated this rule in dicta relying on the 1847 case of Meeker v. Clinton
and P.H.H.R.24
In Meeker, the debtor had given a mortgage to his creditor to secure
payment for shares of stock and to secure any loan which the debtor
borrowed from the creditor up to a stipulated amount. After the mort-
gage had been given but before a loan was made to the debtor, a third
party acquired a security interest in the mortgaged property. A dispute
then arose as to the rank of the mortgage securing the later loan to
the debtor. The Court stated:
The stipulation of a mortgage to secure a loan not made, is an
obligation on a condition potestative on the part of the debtor.
Conventional mortgages of that kind do not take rank from
the date of the inscription. It is not the contract itself which
forms the viniculum juris, but the accomplishment of the con-
dition. The mortgage would have remained inoperative if the
credit had not been used, and it can only have effect from the
date and for the amount of the loan. 25
in the act of mortgage itself. However, it should be noted that the supreme court in
Bozorg indicated that even if the act of mortgage stated that it was to secure future
advances, it may not be sufficient to prove the parties intent to secure future advances
because the pledgee is generally not a party to the collateral mortgage instrument and
the instrument is frequently executed prior to a contract of pledge. 457 So. 2d at 667.
This may cast doubt on language in Acadiana Bank v. Foreman, 352 So. 2d 674 (La.
1977) and People's Bank & Trust v. Campbell, 374 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979),
in which the courts appeared to find an intent on the part of the parties to secure future
advances solely from the language found in the act of mortgage.
23. See cases cited supra at note 19.
24. 2 La. Ann. 971 (1847). This is only dicta in Bozorg because the court ultimately
finds that in the pledge of the collateral mortgage package the original parties did not
intend for it to secure future obligations. Therefore, there was no need to decide from
what date any future advances would be effective against third parties.
25. Id. at 973-74; Langfitt v. Brown, 5 La. Ann. 231 (1850); New Orleans Silversmiths,
Inc. v. Toups, 261 So. 2d 252 (La App. 4th Cir. 1972).
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It should be noted that Meeker did not deal with a collateral
mortgage. From the facts of the case, the security device which was
utilized appears to be an ordinary conventional mortgage for future
advances. The case is arguably wrong in light of Louisiana Civil Code
articles 3292 and 3293. Article 3292 provides: "A mortgage may be
given for an obligation which has not yet risen into existence." Article
3293 states that "the right of mortgage, in this case, shall only be
realized in so far as the promise shall be carried into effect by the
person making it. The fulfillment of the promise, however, shall impart
to the mortgage a retrospective effect to the time of the contract."
(emphasis added). The Meeker court did not make reference to these
two articles. Under article 3293, once the condition was fulfilled, i.e.,
the loan was made to the debtor, the mortgage should have been given
retroactive ranking back to the date of the original contract.
The second line of authority takes the opposite position of Meeker.
In 1852, the Louisiana Supreme Court spoke on the issue of ranking
in Pickersgill & Co. v. Brown,26 a decision which casts doubt on the
viability of the Meeker rationale. In this case, a mortgage was given to
secure future advances. An argument was made that the mortgage se-
curing the future advances could not rank from the date of the original
contract because the principal obligation did not exsist at the time of
the contract. The court recognized the general rule that a principal
obligation must exist since a mortgage is an accessory right, but noted
that the legislature carved out an exception to the rule in Civil Code
articles 3292 and 3293.27 The legislature allowed a wider range for
conventional mortgages by declaring that a conventional mortgage may
be given for an obligation which has not yet risen into existence. The
court noted that the reason for this exception was that a strict con-
struction of the general rule would be inadequate for the practical
purposes of business and the necessities of commerce .2 Therefore, a
mortgage can be given to secure a conditional obligation. 29
Finally, the Meeker argument was made that the mortgage to secure
future advances was one in which the lender was not entitled to ret-
roactive ranking because it contained a potestative condition. The court
disagreed: "This theory is not a new one, and involves difficulties, which
the framers of the code, perhaps, intended to put at rest, when they
introduced the Article 3259 (now article 3292) into the Amendments of
26. 7 La. Ann 297 (1852).
27. Id. at 307.
28. Id.
29. See also New Orleans Silversmiths, Inc. v. Toups, 261 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1972); Collins v. His Creditors, 18 La. Ann. 235 (1866).
[Vol. 46
NOTES
the Code of 1808."3o Arguably, the Pickersgill court recognized that
articles 3292 and 3293 allow a creditor to accomplish what the Meeker
court had held he could not do; the creditor can get retroactive ranking
to the date of the pledge even though the creditor was not bound to
make the advance.
Since the Pickersgill decision, there have been few cases on this
issue. In one case, the court followed Meeker, while in another, the
court followed Pickersgill.3 ' Louisiana courts have not made an attempt
to reconcile these decisions in light of Meeker and Pickersgill. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has established two conflicting resolutions for
the problem of rank when a mortgage is given to secure non-binding
future advances. Perhaps the legislature intended to resolve this conflict,
at least insofar as pledges (and therefore collateral mortgages) are con-
cerned, when they amended Louisiana Civil Code article 3158 in 1952.
The amended article provides, in part:
Whenever a pledge of any instrument ... is made to secure
... advances to be made up to a certain amount, and, if so
desired . . to secure any other obligations of the pledgor to
the pledgee, then existing or thereafter arising, up to the limits
of the pledge, and the pledged instrument remains ... in the
hands of the pledgee, the instrument . .. may . . . be repledged
to the pledgee to secure any new or additional loans, even though
the original loan has been ... paid, . . and the pledge shall
be valid as well against third persons as against the pledgor
thereof, if made in good faith, and such . . . advances . . . shall
be secured by the collateral to the same extent as if they came
into existence when the instrument or item was originally pledged
and the pledge was made to secure them. 32
Future advances, therefore, rank from the date of the original pledge.
The article does not draw any distinction between a binding obligation
to make future advances and those which are optional. It merely states
that if the intent was that it secure future obligations, these obligations
should rank from the date of the initial pledge."
Another method of resolving this conflict is to focus on the actual
concern involved and how the courts are handling this concern. The
30. See also 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law Pt. II, No. 2652, at 473 (11th
ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959); Note, Ranking of Collateral Mortgage, supra note 18,
at 791 n.12; Sachse, Report to the Louisiana Law Institute on Article Nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 41 Tul. L. Rev. 785, 798 (1967); D'Menza v. Generes, 22 La. Ann.
285 (1870).
31. See, e.g., Langfitt and Perry v. Brown, 5 La. Ann. 231 (1850 (citing Meeker);
In re York, 30 Fed. Cas. 811 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 18, 138) (citing Pickersgill).
32. La. Civ. Code art. 3158.
33. See Sachse, supra note 30, at 798.
19851
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
main concern in the Meeker line of cases appears to be that the promise
to lend is optional on the part of the creditor; therefore, he can refuse
to make the loans at his whim. One could hardly imagine a situation
in which someone would prepare a collateral mortgage and collateral
mortgage note, record the mortgage, and hand over the note to another
party with the agreement that it would secure any advances made by
that party, if there was reason to believe that the party would not make a
good faith effort to make the future loans to him. Although the lender
is not obligated to actually make a loan, he usually will not deny the
request for a loan at his whim. There are other factors involved. One
can expect that a lender will make a loan if he is holding a valuable
security interest. In exchange for making the loan, the lender will make
a profit through interest.
Even if the concern in Meeker that the creditor could refuse to
make the loans at his whim is valid, the courts, by holding that collateral
mortgages to secure optional future advances rank only from the date
of the advance, are protecting the wrong party. In light of the above
concern, one would think that the court's holding would inure to the
benefit of the debtor. However, it actually works to the debtor's det-
riment. If a lender cannot receive retroactive ranking to the date of the
actual pledge of the collateral mortgage note for optional future ad-
vances, lending institutions may be inclined to make fewer loans of this
type, since it is possible that other creditors may acquire security interests
between the date of the mortgage and the date of the advance which
would outrank the lender's interest.
A close analysis of the Meeker rationale reveals that ranking actually
inures to the benefit of creditors who acquire security interests between
the time the note is pledged and the funds are advanced. These creditors
benefit from the fact that the collateral mortgagee has the ability to
turn down a request for a loan to the collateral mortgagor. There does
not appear to be any justification for this result. These secured creditors
are already provided adequate protection. When they acquire their se-
curity interests, they do so in reliance upon the public records. The
public records reveal to these creditors the extent to which the property
is encumbered by a collateral mortgage. As additional protection to these
third party creditors, the Louisiana jurisprudence requires that there be
actual delivery of the collateral mortgage note to the mortgagee before
it is effective against third parties.3 4
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held on two occasions that a
mortgage need not state on its face that it is to secure future advances."
34. See cases cited supra at note 19.
35. Pickersgill, 7 La. Ann. 297 (1852); Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Troy, 260 So.
2d 628 (La. 1972).
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These holdings imply that the court recognizes that as long as the third
parties are aware of the potential total security interest held by the
mortgagee (as shown by the amount stated in the act of mortgage) they
are not prejudiced when the future advances are actually made. It follows
that a third party creditor relies only on the fact that the mortgage is
for the amount stated on its face as it appears in the public records.
According to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the creditor is not entitled
to notice that the mortgage may secure future advances; therefore, he
does not know whether the mortgage secures future advances, regardless
of whether the obligation to advance is binding. The Meeker holding
as supported by the court in Bozorg, albeit dicta, allows the third party
creditor to gamble for a benefit. If the result is that according to the
pledge agreement the mortgage secures binding future advances, the
creditor is in no better and no worse of a position than what the public
records revealed to him. However, if the agreement was to secure op-
tional future advances, the third party creditor receives a bonus; he will
outrank the collateral mortgagee.
There is no reason to give this benefit to third party creditors. As
stated above, the court's concern is that the mortgagee will have the
unfair advantage of being able to reject a request for a loan from the
mortgagor at his whim. From a practical standpoint, this concern is not
valid, given the fact that it is to the mortgagee's advantage to make
the loan. Even if it is valid, the holding that the collateral mortgage
to secure future advances will rank only from the date that the actual
advances are made does not solve the problem. This holding merely
acts to confer a bonus on a third party who has acquired a security
interest in property knowing that the property was potentially encum-
bered to the full extent of the recorded mortgage value and not expecting
that his security interest would outrank the collateral mortgagee's.
The Meeker "holding," cryptic as it is, does not serve to minimize
any valid concern. The better position is for the courts to hold that,
once the collateral mortgage has been recorded and the collateral mort-
gage note has actually been delivered to the mortgagee, the future
advances which the parties agreed would be secured by the the collateral
mortgage will rank from the date of the original pledge whether the
mortgagee was bound to advance or not. This position is supported by
the concept of pledge which only requires an agreement to pledge3 6 and
delivery of the pledged item to the pledgee to affect third parties." 7 This
position is also supported by Louisiana Civil Code articles 3292 and
3293 which state that a mortgage given to secure obligations not yet in
36. This agreement need not be in writing for a pledge of a collateral mortgage
package. La. Civ. Code art. 3158.
37. La. Civ. Code art. 3152.
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existence ranks from the date that the mortgage was originally contracted.
Lastly, the language of article 3158 which states that future advances
are secured as if they came into existence when the instrument was
originally pledged, supports this position.
The Bozorg Decision
An issue which has perplexed the lower courts in Louisiana is whether
a collateral mortgagee can transfer the collateral mortgage package to
a third party in such a way as to allow the third party transferee to
rank from the date that the collateral mortgage was initially pledged to
the collateral mortgagee. These cases have focused on the concept ex-
pressed in Louisiana Civil Code article 2645 which provides: "The sale
or transfer of a credit includes every thing which is an accessory to the
same; as suretyship, privileges and mortgages."
In Odom v. Cherokee Homes, Inc., a" the plaintiff, Odom, paid
$120,000.00 to the collateral mortgagee in exchange for four collateral
mortgage notes held in pledge by the mortgagee. The evidence was
unclear as to whether any hand notes were given to Odom.3 9 This
transaction was not evidenced by an act of assignment. The transfer of
the collateral mortgage note took place by mere delivery. When Odom
foreclosed on the collateral mortgage he claimed his mortgage ranked
from the time it was first pledged to the original mortgagee. The
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was no
transfer to Odom of the debt secured by the collateral mortgage package
and that the transaction between the parties operated as a full extin-
guishment of that debt. The mortgagee was no longer in possession of
the pledged item. Once he surrendered possession, there could be no
valid pledgeA0 The delivery of the collateral mortgage notes to Odom
constituted a repledge of the notes, and therefore, the mortgage ranked
from that date. 4'
Since the Odom case, there have been two reported Court of Appeal
decisions which held, under similar facts, that the parties successfully
transferred the original rank of the collateral mortgage package. 42 These
cases relied on the suggestion in Odom that if the obligation which was
38. 165 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
39. It should be noted that there is no requirement that this obligation be evidenced
by hand notes, although it usually is so evidenced. The hand note merely represents an
obligation, which need not be in writing.
40. La. Civ. Code art. 3158.
41. See Nathan, supra note 7, at 514.
42. Mardis v. Hollanger, 426 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Richey v. Venture
Oil & Gas Corp., 346 So. 2d 875 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977). See also, Rubin, The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Security Devices, 39 La. L.
Rev. 719, 725 (1979).
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secured by the collateral mortgage package had been assigned to the
transferee, the mortgage would rank from its first issuance. In Richey
v. Venture Oil & Gas Corp. 4 3 the parties drafted an agreement trans-
ferring, selling, and assigning the hand note which was secured by the
collateral mortgage note and collateral mortgage. Relying on Odom and
a clause in the original pledge agreement which gave the mortgagee the
right to transfer the collateral mortgage note in connection with a transfer
of the hand note, the court held that there was a valid transfer entitling
Richey to the initial ranking date.
In Mardis v. Hollanger,44 the parties again sold the hand note, but
took extra precaution in delivering the collateral mortgage note to the
transferee by executing a trust agreement making the mortgagor's at-
torney an "escrow agent" for delivery of the hand note and collateral
mortgage note to the transferee. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court
of Appeal stated that by doing so the pledge was never returned to the
pledgor and, therefore, retained its initial rank 5. 4  In both Richey and
Mardis, the pledge was no longer in the possession of the original
pledgee, but the court recognized that the collateral mortgage maintained
its initial rank because the hand notes were validly negotiated or assigned
to the new pledgee.4 6
In Bozorg, the Louisiana Supreme Court was faced with the transfer
issue as well as the issue of whether the transferee could receive ret-
roactive ranking for new monies which the transferee advanced in the
future. On the issue of transfer, the court examined the 1980 transaction,
in which First Metropolitan transferred and assigned to Texas Bank its
interest in the collateral mortgage note and collateral mortgage. The
Court stated that Texas Bank would have First Metropolitan's rights in
the rank of the collateral if the transaction was: (1) an assignment;4 7
(2) a payment with subrogation; 41 or (3) a novation with reservation of
the pledge privilege and mortgage. 49 The court reasoned, however, that
if the transfer was a payoff of the obligation which was secured by the
collateral mortgage package without subrogation or reservation of the
43. 346 So. 2d 875.
44. 426 So. 2d 392.
45. Id. at 397.
46. 449 So. 2d at 1104.
47. La. Civ. Code art. 2645 provides: "The sale or transfer of a credit includes
everything which is an accessory to the same; as suretyship, privileges, and mortgages."
48. The Louisiana Civil Code allows a creditor who receives his payment from a
third person to subrogate that person to his rights. La. Civ. Code art. 1827 (former
article 2160(1)).
49. If the parties agree, the security which was given for the performance of the
extinguished obligation may be transferred to the new pledgee. La. Civ. Code art. 1884
(former art. 2195).
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privilege and mortgage, the privilege which arose from the pledge of
the collateral mortgage package was also extinguished. 0
In determining whether an assignment had taken place, the court
noted that First Metropolitan did not own the collateral mortgage note,
but merely held it in pledge. Consequently, it could not sell the collateral
mortgage note, but it did own and, therefore, could sell the obligation
represented by the hand note. The court found no evidence that there
had been an assignment of the hand note, and Texas Bank conceded
that the hand note was not part of the act of assignment. 1 The court
concluded, therefore, that there was no assignment of the principal
obligation.
The court next examined the record to see whether Texas Bank had
paid the hand note with the right of subrogation to First Metropolitan's
"privileges and mortgages."15 2 Relying solely on the testimony of a loan
officer of First Metropolitan that the parties had intended that Texas
Bank buy their "collateral position," the court stated that this evidence
showed that the debt was paid by Texas Bank on the condition that
First Metropolitan's "rights" in the collateral mortgage were transferred
to Texas Bank." The supreme court concluded that the $88,025.34
payment by Texas Bank of Beaumont at all times remained secured by
the pledge of Bozorg's earlier collateral mortgage note, effective as of
August, 1975.
The court then addressed whether Texas Bank was entitled to ret-
roactive ranking with respect to the February, 1980 advance of new
monies in excess of the outstanding balance at the time of the transfer.
The Court adopted the rule of New Orleans Silversmiths, Inc. v. Toups,14
that, in order for a transferee to be entitled to retroactive ranking to
the date of the initial pledge, for all future advances, he must prove
that:
(1) The initial pledge was properly confected;
(2) The parties mutually agreed at the time of the original
pledge that the pledge would also secure obligations thereafter
arising;
(3) Each subsequent loan was especially secured by the pledge
of the original collateral mortgage note;
50. 457 So. 2d at 673; see also Alford, 366 So. 2d at 1303.
51. If the hand note had been in bearer form, it could have been transferred by
mere delivery, but Texas Bank failed to produce the hand note and there was no evidence
to prove that the note was in bearer form. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d at 673.
52. La. Civ. Code art. 1827 (former art. 2160 (1)).
53. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d at 673.




(4) The pledged collateral has continuously remained in the
hands of the pledgee, and
(5) The parties acted in good faith.5"
The Silversmith court pointed out that this retroactive effect may
apply to new or additional loans, even though the original debt has
been fully paid, if the parties mutually consent.
The supreme court did not actually reach the issue of whether Texas
Bank would be entitled to retroactive ranking for the advances made
to Bozorg after January 4, 1980, because there was no evidence in the
record regarding whether the original contract of pledge to First Met-
ropolitan provided that the pledge would secure future obligations.5 6 The
record showed only an intent to secure the initial loan and therefore
Texas Bank failed to prove the second requirement of the Silversmith
test. Following the rule that a privilege, such as one that arises from
a pledge, must be strictly construed, the court concluded that the ret-
roactive ranking could only be claimed for those debts to which it was
expressly granted-the initial loan of $88,025.34. 57
Was the Transaction a Payment With Subrogation?
The Court's conclusion that Texas Bank effectively paid off the
hand note in exchange for subrogation to First Metropolitan's rights
appears to be an attempt by the court to protect Texas Bank in its
effort to acquire a valid security interest. The Louisiana Civil Code
allows a creditor who receives payment from a third person to subrogate
that person to his rights,5" however, this subrogation must be express.5 9
The Bozorg court based its finding solely on the testimony of the First
Metropolitan officer who stated that the parties intended for Texas Bank
to buy First Metropolitan's "collateral position." There was no testimony
that Texas Bank was expressly told that they would be given subrogation
to First Metropolitan's rights in the collateral security. The bank officer's
testimony referred to an intent to sell, not an intent to make a payoff
55. Id. at 254.
56. This contract of pledge need not be in writing according to Louisiana Civil Code
article 3158; however, the Bozorg case illustrates the necessity that it be in writing in
order to prove the parties intent should litigation arise. See also Alford, 366 So. 2d at
1299.
57. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d at 674.
58. La. Civ. Code art. 1827 (former art. 2160(1)).
59. This requirement was stated in former article 2160(1). Although, it is not stated
in article 1827, it can be argued that this is still a requirement. The comments to article
1827 state that this article is based on former article 2160(1) and that it changes the law
only insofar as it eliminates the distinction between conventional subrogation and assign-
ment of rights.
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with subrogation. The requirement of an express subrogation does not
appear to have been met on the face of the record.
In Odom, 60 plaintiff's witnesses testified that the parties intended
that the mortgagee's debt not be extinguished by the transaction and,
therefore, the collateral mortgage would not be extinguished. The fourth
circuit stated: "What they say their intentions were is of little conse-
quence if their actions had a legal effect different from such inten-
tions." ' 61 Similarly, in the Bozorg case, the court should not have placed
as much weight on the officer's testimony regarding the intent of the
parties if there was no evidence that they had in fact given effect to
that intent.
By finding that the transaction was a subrogation, the court was
able to pretermit the issue of novation. A novation takes place when,
by the agreement of the parties, a new performance is substituted for
that previously owed, such as when a new collateral mortgagee is sub-
stituted for the original mortgagee. 62 The supreme court's dicta suggested
that, if the parties agree at the time of the transfer of the obligation
which is secured by the pledged collateral mortgage package that the
pledge is also being transferred, then the transferee is entitled to rank
from the date of the original pledge. 63
Assuming that the court was correct in finding that a payment with
subrogation had taken place, it is significant to note that the Louisiana
Supreme Court has now provided authorization for two different meth-
ods for a collateral mortgagee to transfer its rights in a collateral
mortgage. In Odom and its progeny, there was no mention of whether
there had been a payment with subrogation or a novation with reservation
of the pledge privilege and mortgage. The facts in Odom were strikingly
similar to those in Bozorg. If the facts of Odom were before the court
today and if payment with subrogation were to be urged by the parties,
it is arguable that the result would be different. In light of Bozorg, a
transferee, who is attempting to acquire the rights of its transferor in
the collateral mortgage, should urge in the alternative that the transaction
in which the transfer took place was either: (1) an assignment; (2) a
payoff with subrogation; 64 or (3) a novation with reservation of the
pledge privilege and mortgage.
60. 165 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
61. Id. at 864.
62. La. Civ. Code art. 1881.
63. 457 So. 2d at 672; La. Civ. Code art. 1884. (former art. 2195).
64. It should be noted that Louisiana Civil Code article 1827 which replaced article
2160 (1) (the article in effect at the time the Bozorg case was decided) may have an
effect on the parties' ability to confect a valid transfer of the security interest by way
of a payoff with subrogation. The comments to new article 1827 state that the subrogation
need not be made at the same time as the payment. It may be that the supreme court
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Can the Transferee Avail Himself of Retroactive Ranking
for Future Advances?
The Bozorg decision contains some troublesome language with re-
spect to whether the transferee of a collateral mortgage note and col-
lateral mortgage could ever avail himself of retroactive ranking under
article 3158 for later loans. The court, in a parenthetical reference, states
that it is not deciding the issue of whether an assignee could ever do
So. 65 The court has left open the possibility that the answer to this
question could be no. However, there is dicta in the opinion which
indicates the court's answer to the question would be in the affirmative.
In its conclusion, the court stated:
Therefore, for [Texas Bank] to establish entitlement to retroactive
ranking, it was necessary to prove that [First Metropolitan] and
Bozorg mutually agreed in the 1975 contract of pledge that the
pledge would also secure the pledgor's subsequently arising ob-
ligations for which the original collateral mortgage could be
additionally pledged . . . . [Texas Bank] did not prove its com-
pliance with the requirements of Article 3158 for retroactive
ranking. 66
Certainly, if the court had serious doubts as to the ability of a transferee
to acquire retroactive ranking for future loans, it would not have sug-
gested how Texas Bank could have successfully acquired this right.
Conclusion
Texas Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg is significant for two reasons.
First, the Louisiana Supreme Court has authorized two additional means
by which a third party may acquire the security interest held by a
collateral mortgage other than by an assignment. In addition to an
assignment, a transfer may take place by either: (1) a payment with
subrogation; or (2) a novation with reservation of the pledge privilege
and mortgage. It should be noted that both of these methods require
strict formalities. A court should only find that a subrogation or a
novation with reservation has transpired when the evidence clearly in-
dicates that the formalities did in fact take place.
Second, the supreme court, in dicta, has raised doubt as to whether
a third party, who has validly acquired the security interest from a
would not be willing to find a valid transfer of the security interest when the note is
marked paid and then months later the parties agree that the transferor will grant the
transferee subrogation to the rights it had before the note was paid off.
65. 457 So. 2d at 674. The court was able to avoid this issue by finding there was
no proof of intent in the original pledge agreement to secure future advances.
66. 457 So. 2d at 674-75 (emphasis added).
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collateral mortgagee, may avail himself of the retroactive ranking pro-
vided for future advances in Louisiana Civil Code article 3158. There
is other dicta in the opinion which indicates that should the issue be
presented, the court would allow retroactive ranking provided: (1) the
transfer is valid; and (2) the original parties intended that the pledge
would secure future advances.
It appears that the safest method to insure that a transferee has
acquired the collateral mortgage package entitling him to retroactive
ranking for both pre-existing obligations and future obligations is to
have the collateral mortgagee execute a conventional act of assignment
transferring the hand note and his right in the collateral mortgage
package. This act should also transfer the written pledge agreement. If
the pledge agreement was not reduced to writing, the transferee should
get a written affirmative representation from the collateral mortgagee
that, at the time of the initial pledge, the parties intended that the
pledge would secure future advances, and the transferee should also
obtain a warranty from the mortgagee that this representation is correct.
Should a court later hold that there was no such intent, this warranty
should entitle the transferee to sue the mortgagee for any damages the
misrepresentation might have caused. If the mortgagee cannot make such
a representation, the transferee should not make any subsequent advances
because they will not be ranked from the date of the initial pledge.
Shannan Clare Sweeney
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